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NOTE
REVITALIZING MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY
PLEADING AFTER TELLABS
Marvin Lowenthal*
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA") to prevent frivolous lawsuits that had been drain-
ing resources from businesses. This legislation included provisions
for heightening the pleading requirements for the scienter or state
of mind, requirement for securities law violations. Many circuit
courts debated whether the motive and opportunity test for scienter
applied initially by the Second and Third Circuits, survived the pas-
sage of the PSLRA. This Note argues that while the motive and
opportunity test has been discounted by numerous circuits, it not
only remains viable for pleading scienter under the PSLRA, but it
accomplishes the PSLRA's goals better than any other standard
presently available. Despite the concerns voiced by many circuit
courts, the PSLRA was not passed to eliminate the motive and op-
portunity test, nor is the motive and opportunity test, as it is now
applied by the Second Circuit, inconsistent with the PSLRA. In ad-
dition, while the recent Supreme Court decision in Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. convinced the Third Circuit to aban-
don the motive and opportunity test, the language of Tellabs
demonstrates that the decision did not eliminate the test. Not only is
the motive and opportunity test still viable, but it serves the policy
reasons behind enacting the PSLRA better than the holistic ap-
proach utilized by other circuit courts.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the U.S. securities industry earned $1 trillion.' However, our se-
curities markets were also facing substantial litigation pressure. While private
securities class actions are an important part of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's ("SEC") enforcement strategy, they can also be a burden on
corporations. A study in the early 1990s conducted by Janet Cooper Alexan-
der analyzed settlements in securities class actions and determined that
companies settled for a similar amount, roughly one-quarter the potential
damages, regardless of the merits of the case.2 Her analysis considered the
incentives of both plaintiffs and defendants in securities class actions and con-
cluded that defendants had a strong incentive to settle, as did plaintiffs.3
1. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687 [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT].
2. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 500 (1991). Alexander also listed potential problems that
could result from a settlement system that does not relate to the merits of the cases, including deter-
ring valuable corporate risk-taking, dissuading qualified people from becoming corporate directors,
and undercompensation for meritorious claims. Id. at 570. One of her recommended solutions was
to enact a structural change to litigation procedures that would more easily allow the claim to be
resolved without the need for trial. See id. at 585-86. The discussion in the article focused on the
summary judgment standard and why, while it might serve as a good way to remove claims on the
merits before trial, it would also be dangerous: if courts relax the summary judgment rules in one
area, it would relax summary judgment rules across the board since those rules apply across all
subject matter. Id. at 587. To avoid these problems, Alexander suggested substantive changes would
target specific elements, like the scienter standard. Id.
3. Id. at 524-57.
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Taking advantage of the incentives to settle, plaintiffs' firms have been
accused of "legal extortion," filing baseless lawsuits against corporations in
order to extract settlements, which the corporation agrees to in order to save
the expense of litigation. For example, within days or even hours of a drop
in stock price, firms initiate lawsuits, even when there is little or no evidence
of wrongdoing.! Congress's report on the problems of meritless suits de-
signed to provoke settlement-known as "strike suits"-was highlighted by
James Kimsey's testimony, the co-founder, CEO, and first chairman of
America Online: "Even when a company committed no fraud, indeed no
negligence, there is still the remote possibility of huge jury verdicts, not to
mention the costs of litigation. In the face of such exposure, defendant com-
panies inevitably settle these suits rather than go to trial."' Even though
companies may have done nothing wrong, litigation can be unpredictable,
and with the massive potential harm, companies consider settlement the sa-
fer option. Thus, strike suits lead to a needless drain on the resources of law-
abiding companies whenever any negative news is presented.
Not only are law-abiding companies damaged, but Congress felt that if
left unchecked, the whole of the United States would suffer as a result of
these strike suits.' Professor David Fischel testified on this issue using hypo-
thetical pharmaceutical companies to illustrate:
[Once a similarly-situated company has been sued, other companies] have
several options, none of which are socially desirable. Some companies
may decide not to go public. In this way, they can avoid possible liability
but only by incurring the costs associated with more expensive private fi-
nancing. Other companies may decide not to experiment with risky drugs.
By avoiding risky projects, firms can avoid adverse outcomes that result in
dramatic stock price declines. This solution, too, is undesirable, because
society does not get the benefit of products that are never developed. The
drug in the above example, after all, should be introduced because it is
beneficial even though its benefits were less than was initially anticipated.
A third solution is to remain silent about the drug because the company
cannot later be accused of "fraud" if it chose not to speak in the first place.
These "solutions" are perverse because investors-the supposed benefici-
aries of the existing law-are denied the opportunity to invest in and learn
about attractive but risky ventures.
As Fischel explains, the public is harmed when corporations are forced
to take action to protect themselves from strike suits. In exchange for the
damage that could result from these strike suits, the lawyers initiating the
4. Bernadette Tansey, Rise in biotech lawsuits: Industry blames law firms looking for new
targets, but some investors claim companies misled them, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.sfgate.com (search for the title in a full archive search).
5. TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: CALIFORNIA, A REPORT ON THE LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN CALIFOR-
NIA (2005), http://www.triallawyersinc.com/ca/ca05.html.
6. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 17 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. See infra notes 19, 21-23.
8. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 19-20.
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suits recover significant fees, while each shareholder recovers mere pen-
nies.9 Under these circumstances, the securities laws fail to prevent fraud,
because lawsuits are filed whether or not fraud existed.'o A company's
shareholders are the ones harmed by corporate fraud, because it is their
money in the corporation being used improperly. Thus, an anti-fraud legal
system could work either by preventing fraud from happening or by reim-
bursing the shareholders when fraud does happen. If there is no deterrent
value, a recovery of fractions of a dollar for shareholders does not seem to
counterbalance the harm from strike suits.
In response to this issue, Congress passed the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") to reign in securities fraud suits. The
PSLRA established certain requirements for pleading securities class ac-
tions, as well as other provisions designed to check abusive filings by
attorneys." The required state of mind, or "scienter," for securities law vio-
lations targeted by the PSLRA has been defined by the Supreme Court as "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 2 The cir-
cuit courts have long split in interpreting how the scienter element of the
PSLRA's pleading standard should be satisfied. After the passage of the
PSLRA, there were three viewpoints: the Second and Third Circuits allowed
allegations of motive and opportunity to deceive, manipulate, or defraud
alone to satisfy the pleading requirement; the Ninth Circuit did not con-
sider allegations of motive and opportunity sufficient;"4 and the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits employed what is
known as the "intermediate approach," allowing allegations of motive and
opportunity to help show scienter, but not considering them sufficient in
15
every case.
The Supreme Court recently resolved a different but related circuit split
in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.'6 The full effect of the deci-
sion is not yet clear. However, after Tellabs the Third Circuit declared that
9. Id. at 17-18.
10. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
I1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
12. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
13. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307, 310 (2d Cir. 2000).
14. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999).
15. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195-97 (1st Cir. 1999); Ottmann v. Hanger
Orthopedic Grp., 353 E3d 338, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400,
410-12 (5th Cit. 2001); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cit. 1999); Fla.
State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 654-67 (8th Cir. 2001); City of Phila. v.
Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261-63 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d
1271, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 1999). While there were variations in the way some of these circuits for-
mulated this middle standard, discussion of the pre-Tellabs variations is not necessary for this Note.
16. 551 U.S. 308, 321-22 (2007); see infra notes 48-53.
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the motive and opportunity test is no longer viable, 7 while the Second Cir-
cuit continues to use it."
This Note argues that not only does pleading motive and opportunity ac-
cording to the Second Circuit's current standards still satisfy the PSLRA's
scienter requirement, it also accomplishes the PSLRA's goals better than the
tests used in other circuits. Part I supplies a brief background regarding the
PSLRA and the divergent interpretations the circuits have adopted for the
scienter pleading requirements. Part II shows that the motive and opportu-
nity test utilized by the Second and Third Circuits was not eliminated by the
PSLRA. Part Ill then focuses on the language of Tellabs and how different
circuits have interpreted it, concluding that Tellabs did not eliminate the
motive and opportunity test. Part IV argues that allowing scienter to be pled
through motive and opportunity better serves the policy goals of the
PSLRA: the intermediate approach does not appear to be any better at filter-
ing out meritless suits, and the motive and opportunity test better promotes
uniformity in application than the intermediate approach.
I. BACKGROUND
The PSLRA establishes requirements for pleading securities class ac-
tions, which are typically filed under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.'9 In these lawsuits, a class alleges that it was harmed
by fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the sale or purchase of
securities.20 The legislative history of the PSLRA notes a concern that if cor-
porations were threatened with class actions every time they announced bad
news, they would stop making voluntary disclosures. 2' For example, the
PSLRA regulates the calculation of damages and determination of attorney
fees, settlements, discovery stays, and provides sanctions for attorneys who
pursue unwarranted suits.22
The PSLRA also seeks to block frivolous lawsuits while permitting me-
ritorious claims by establishing a uniform, high pleading standard across the
United States.23 The PSLRA requires that in order to bring suit a plaintiff
must allege facts that give rise to a "strong inference" that the defendant
acted with the necessary state of mind, and the facts must be stated with
particularity in the complaint.24 Accordingly, the complaint has to specify
17. Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276 (3d Cir. 2009).
18. E.g., ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553
F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2009).
19. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
21. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
22. Id. at 10-15, 19-20.
23. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320-21 (2007).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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However, the PSLRA nowhere explains exactly what facts are necessary to
26
satisfy its strong inferences standard.
The Second Circuit settled on a two-prong test to satisfy the strong in-
ference standard: a strong inference of scienter can be pled either by
showing the defendant had "both motive and opportunity to commit fraud"
or by alleging facts showing "strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness." 27 Satisfying either prong alone is sufficient to
successfully plead scienter, and therefore any case that is dismissed must
fail the motive and opportunity test. While satisfying the second prong
without showing a motive is possible, it requires that the plaintiff present
stronger circumstantial evidence.28 Before the PSLRA was passed, the mo-
tive and opportunity test was widely considered the most stringent scienter
test.29 After the PSLRA was passed, some courts have argued that the test is
too lenient, although recent decisions from the Second Circuit evince an
intention to ensure that the motive and opportunity test is not too easily
met.o
As the Second Circuit applies the test, motives that are possessed by
most corporate directors and officers do not satisfy the motive and opportu-
nity test." For example, the motive and opportunity test would not be
satisfied by allegations of a corporate executive's motive to "maintain the
appearance of corporate profitability, or of the success of an investment."32
Thus, alleging such motives does not make a finding of scienter more like-
ly." Allegations of motive also require that "a concrete and personal benefit
to the individual defendants resulting from the fraud" is shown.3 Opportu-
nity is present if the defendant has a means of receiving the benefits of a
fraud, and that fraud is likely to succeed." For example, key directors and
25. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1).
26. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 321-22; see also § 78u-4(b)(2).
27. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc.,
47 E.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995)).
28. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2001). This Note references the Second
Circuit's second prong only as an illustration of a possible test that can be employed. The focus here
is on the motive and opportunity test and the benefits it offers over the standards employed in other
circuits. While this Note acknowledges that some supplemental test, like the Second Circuit's sec-
ond prong, must be employed by courts utilizing the motive and opportunity test, see infra Part III,
the second prong is not the only supplemental test a court could use.
29. See infra Section II.A.
30. See infra Section II.B.
31. Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139.
32. Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996).
33. See, e.g., Malin v. XL Capital, Ltd., 312 F. App'x 400,402 (2d Cir. 2009).
34. Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139.
35. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp,
Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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officers are considered to have the opportunity to manipulate their com-
36
pany's stock price.
Most of the circuit courts have rejected the motive and opportunity test
in favor of what is termed the "intermediate approach"-a generalized,
case-by-case examination-developed after the passage of the PSLRA. This
standard is essentially a holistic balancing test." It instructs the court to look
at the complaint as a whole and determine whether or not it sufficiently al-
leges facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter." Under this standard,
pleading motive and opportunity may sometimes be enough to give rise to a
strong inference of scienter, but not always.39 According to courts following
the intermediate approach, the PSLRA did not endorse or prohibit any par-
ticular method of pleading scienter, so the complaint must be viewed in its
entirety. 0
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA pleading standard was
the strictest until it was recently abandoned. Its Silicon Graphics approach,
employed from 1999 to 2008, required the plaintiff to show "deliberately
reckless or conscious misconduct."4' Under Silicon Graphics, pleading mo-
tive and opportunity alone was never sufficient to give rise to a strong
inference of scienter. The standard refused to allow vague allegations to
contribute in any way to a finding of scienter.43 The complaint had to "state
specific facts indicating no less than a degree of recklessness that strongly
suggests actual intent,"" meaning that without a substantial number of cor-
roborating details, the pleading would be inadequate. 45 The Silicon Graphics
standard was recently deemed by the Ninth Circuit too harsh in light of the
recent Supreme Court decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd.46 The other two approaches are still in use; a substantial circuit split still
exists. 47
In Tellabs the Supreme Court resolved another circuit split that con-
cerned a different but related aspect of pleading securities law violations.4
In that case, shareholders filed suit against a company president for
36. San Leandro Emergency Med. Grp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d
801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996).
37. See infra notes 181-189.
38. Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003).
39. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999).
40. E.g., Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345.
41. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
42. Id. at 979.
43. See, e.g., S. Ferry LP No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 782-84 (9th Cir. 2008).
44. Id. at 782 (citing Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979).
45. Id. at 783.
46. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
47. It is not clear what the current standard is in the Ninth Circuit, now that Silicon Graphics
is not longer valid. However, the issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
48. See 551 U.S. 308, 320-22 (2007); see also infra Part I.
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allegedly inflating his company's stock price. 49 While examining whether
scienter had been adequately pled, the Seventh Circuit asked only if a rea-
sonable factfinder could infer that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind from the facts alleged.50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to address whether other possible inferences had to be considered when de-
ciding whether a pleading sufficiently alleges scienter, and determined that
such competing inferences must be taken into account.5 ' While certiorari
was not granted to resolve the circuit split regarding the proper scienter
standard, the Third Circuit still decided that Tellabs required it to abandon
the motive and opportunity test. 52 The Second Circuit, however, still applies
the test.53
II. THE PSLRA's PASSAGE DOES NOT PREVENT MOTIVE AND
OPPORTUNITY PLEADING
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Tellabs, nothing in the PSLRA
prohibited pleading motive and opportunity to satisfy the requirement of
scienter. Rather, pre-Tellabs jurisprudence produced no clear answer regard-
ing whether pleading motive and opportunity satisfied the scienter pleading
requirement of the PSLRA. In interpreting the act, circuits were split con-
cerning whether and to what extent the motive and opportunity test was
sufficient. Section II.A examines the legislative history, finding no evidence
that the PSLRA was intended to eliminate the motive and opportunity test.
Section II.B argues that the motive and opportunity test is not inherently too
weak to meet the elevated PSLRA standard, particularly in the more strin-
gent form recently applied by the Second Circuit. Finally, Section II.C
argues that the legislative history surrounding the rejection of the Specter
Amendment, which would have codified the Second Circuit's two-prong
test, does not demonstrate congressional intent to ban the motive and oppor-
tunity test.
A. The PSLRA Does Not Eliminate Motive and Opportunity Pleading by
Raising the National Pleading Standard
While the PSLRA was designed to raise the pleading standard for sci-
enter,54 its heightened requirements do not prohibit a motive and opportunity
test. Arguments advanced by scholars that Congress intended to create a
49. Id. at 315-16.
50. Id. at 314.
51. Id.
52. Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276 (3d Cir. 2009).
53. E.g., ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553
F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2009).
54. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
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pleading standard so high that no pre-PSLRA test is capable of satisfying it"
are not supported by the text or legislative history. The text of the PSLRA
establishes a pleading standard that requires the plaintiff to plead "facts giv-
ing rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind."5 The requirement to plead facts giving rise to a "strong inference"
of the necessary state of mind was already the standard utilized by the Sec-
ond Circuit before the PSLRA." Indeed, Congress chose to model its
pleading standard on that of the Second Circuit, rather than adopt a new
pleading standard.
Congress did not fully adopt the Second Circuit's standard with the
PSLRA, because Congress did not codify the Second Circuit's caselaw into
the act. Nevertheless, Congress did not intend to prevent courts from using
the motive and opportunity test. Although the legislative history makes clear
that the statute did not codify the caselaw of the Second Circuit, it does
mention that other circuits may find the body of law within the Second Cir-
cuit "instructive."" While the act was not intended to specifically promote
the Second Circuit's test, if the PSLRA was written to eliminate the test em-
ployed by the Second Circuit, Congress would not have referred other courts
to learn from the Second Circuit's cases. Thus, the text of the PSLRA does
not evince congressional intent to eliminate the motive and opportunity test.
Legislative history does not indicate Congress concluded the Second
Circuit's pleading standard was not strict enough to meet the policy goals of
the PSLRA. Some circuit courts analyzing the PSLRA's pleading require-
ment have started from the premise that the motive and opportunity test is a
low standard to satisfy and therefore is inconsistent with the goal of creating
a stringent pleading requirementi 0 But assuming that the motive and oppor-
tunity standard is inherently low is inaccurate, and is contrary to the
statements made by courts and Congress at the time the PSLRA was
drafted.
Before the passage of the PSLRA, the Second Circuit's standard was
recognized, even in Congress's discussions leading to the PSLRA's enact-
ment, as the most stringent pleading requirement in the country.6' Although
55. See, e.g., Scott H. Moss, Comment, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: The
Scienter Debacle, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 1279, 1283, 1319 (2000).
56. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 21D(b)(2), 109
Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4).
57. Novak, 216 F.3d at310.
58. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 ("[Tihe Committee chose a uniform standard mod-
eled upon the pleading standard of the Second Circuit.").
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that the plain meaning of the statute raised the pleading standard beyond the motive and
opportunity test).
61. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 ("Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard,
the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a 'strong inference' of de-
fendant's fraudulent intent.") (footnote omitted); cf In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542,
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Congress selected a standard based on the Second Circuit's, the PSLRA's
statutory language "strong inference" alone did not fully explain how the
standard should function. Therefore, Congress directed other courts to the
Second Circuit's caselaw to illustrate how strict the standard was. Under the
Second Circuit's law, one way to define the threshold of scienter is the mo-
tive and opportunity test.62 If Congress felt the motive and opportunity test
applied the standard too leniently, it would either not refer courts to the Sec-
ond Circuit's precedent or would specifically exclude cases where the
pleading requirement was satisfied under the motive and opportunity analy-
sis. As Congress did neither, its enactment should be interpreted to mean
that motive and opportunity was sufficiently strict to meet the PSLRA's pol-
icy goals.
B. A Strong Inference of Scienter Is Required
After the PSLRA was enacted, some circuit courts recognized that the
motive and opportunity test was not necessarily too lenient to satisfy the
PSLRA's strict standard requirement. These circuit courts, all of which have
adopted the intermediate approach, noted that there might be certain cases in
which motive and opportunity will be sufficient to plead scienter.' These
courts argue, however, that not every set of facts in which a motive and an
opportunity are present gives rise to a "strong inference of scienter."6 Using
this reasoning, these courts concluded that while motive and opportunity can
contribute to an allegation of scienter, motive and opportunity is not disposi-
tive for a finding of a strong inference.
A stringent implementation of the motive and opportunity test, which is
only satisfied where the facts demonstrating motive and opportunity are suf-
ficient to give rise to a "strong inference of scienter," would resolve the
concerns voiced by these courts. Implicitly, these circuit courts have as-
sumed that the motive and opportunity test, as administered by the Second
Circuit, can be satisfied in situations where the facts do not give rise to a
strong inference of scienter.66
549 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that before the PSLRA, the Second Circuit employed the most stringent
test, requiring facts showing either motive and opportunity or conscious or reckless behavior).
62. There is another way to test for scienter in the Second Circuit that, while not the focus of
this Note, is discussed in more detail later. See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 412 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Comshare,
183 F.3d at 551; Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 E3d 185, 196-97 (1st Cir. 1999).
64. See, e.g., In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551 ("[T]hose courts addressing motive and oppor-
tunity in Securities Act cases have held only that facts showing a motive and opportunity may
adequately allege scienter, not that the existence of motive and opportunity may support, as scienter
itself, liability . . . .").
65. E.g., Greebel, 194 E3d at 197.
66. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 E3d 1245, 1262 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[M]otive
and opportunity may be important .. . but are typically not sufficient in themselves to establish a
'strong inference' of scienter."); In re Comshare, 183 E3d at 551 (stating that motive and opportu-
nity may occasionally be sufficient to show scienter, but not always); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197
(quoting In re Comshare).
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While there may have once been a more lenient standard in the Second
Circuit where scienter could be sufficiently alleged, without facts demon-
strating a strong inference, the present standard employed for motive and
67
opportunity is more stringent. Before the PSLRA, the Second Circuit
struggled to ensure that the motives captured by the motive and opportunity
test would not be so sweeping that meritless lawsuits would satisfy the stan-
dard. The court discussed the need for balancing the goal of catching fraud
against preventing undeserved settlements from being extracted from corpo-
rations,6 and seemed to have come down on the side of reducing the number
of undeserved settlements at the cost of allowing more fraud to escape judi-
cial scrutiny.6 The Second Circuit noted that "[w]hile some fraud may go
unpunished as a result of Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard, we re-
cently acknowledged that we cannot eliminate all opportunities for
'unremedied fraud' without creating opportunities for 'undeserved settle-
ments.' ,,70
After the PSLRA was enacted, the Second Circuit's motive and oppor-
tunity standard entered a period of fluctuation. Scholars recognize that
different panels of the Second Circuit applied inconsistent standards for eva-
luating whether a plaintiff adequately pled motive and opportunity." This
split began in 1999 with Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp.7 2 In
Press, a man bought a Treasury bill through a company but was not told that
the funds would only be available to him four days after the bill matured; he
believed he would have access to them on the bill's maturity date. 73 The
court found motive and opportunity for the misrepresentation adequately
pled: the company had a motive to keep his money so it could use the funds
after the Treasury bill matured and had an opportunity since the money was
74in its possession. However, the court later held that the company's repre-
sentation that the funds would be available the day the bill matured was
immaterial. The focus of the court in Press was on creating a lenient stan-
dard when considering intent to ensure that plaintiffs did not face overly
burdensome hurdles in bringing private securities law actions. A pleading
67. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (describing the abandonment of the more
lenient line of cases).
68. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1993).
69. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
70. Id.
71. Brian S. Sommer, Note, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Impmving the Balance in
Private Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 425-
26 (2005).
72. 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
73. Id. at 532-33.
74. Id. at 538.
75. Id. at 538-39.
76. See id. at 538 ("[W]e are not inclined to create a nearly impossible pleading standard
when the 'intent' of a corporation is at issue.").
635February 2011 ]
Michigan Law Review
standard cannot be very strict if allegations of immaterial facts can satisfy
the requirements.n
In contrast, Novak v. Kasaks,7' decided only one year later, employed a
stricter motive and opportunity test. After categorizing the Press court's
comments about the PSLRA's pleading standard as dicta, 79 Novak defined
motive and opportunity: "Motive would entail concrete benefits that could
be realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclo-
sures alleged. Opportunity would entail the means and likely prospect of
achieving concrete benefits by the means alleged." t' Notably, the court dis-
qualified motives that almost all corporate insiders possess from satisfying
the motive and opportunity test, such as a desire to have their company ap-
pear profitable.8 ' Here the focus was not on creating a lenient standard for
plaintiffs, as in Press, but on confining motive and opportunity pleading to
make sure it was not too easily satisfied.
The Second Circuit oscillated between these two standards,82 partly be-
cause one panel of the Second Circuit may not overrule a decision by
another panel unless an intervening Supreme Court decision affects the prior
decision.83 The key difference between the two standards is in the goal the
court sought to achieve: whereas the Press court strove to create a lenient
standard for plaintiffs, Novak worked to confine motive and opportunity
pleading to make sure it was not overly inclusive and too easily satisfied.
Since no such Supreme Court decision occurred between Press and Novak,
the Second Circuit was deciding cases with two different, yet precedentially
valid, means of conducting the motive and opportunity test. As a result,
some decisions, following the Novak line, strongly stated that generalized
allegations of motive were insufficient, while others, following the Press
line, tempered that concept with the idea that motive and opportunity stan-
dard should not be overly harsh. 4
77. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REv. 627, 672-73
(2002).
78. 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000).
79. Id. at 309-10.
80. Id. at 307 (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994)).
81. Id. at 307-08.
82. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 672-73.
83. See United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 227 n.l (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Finkel v.
Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1992)).
84. Compare Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[W]hat is required when
endeavoring to plead facts supporting a strong inference of scienter by showing motive and oppor-
tunity is not a bare invocation of magic words such as 'motive and opportunity' but an allegation of
facts showing the type of particular circumstances that our case law has recognized will render
motive and opportunity probative of a strong inference of scienter.") (citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216
F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000)), with Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir. 2000)
("Although speculation and conclusory allegations will not suffice, neither do we require 'great
specificity' provided the plaintiff alleges enough facts to support 'a strong inference of fraudulent
intent.") (quoting Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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Further evidence of the internal conflict within the Second Circuit over
the stricter or more lenient standard is shown by the precedent cited in two
of the cases decided during these oscillations, Rothman v. Gregor and Gan-
ino v. Citizens Utilitieso,16 both decided in 2000. Rothman, the strict
standard case, repeatedly cited Novak but never cited Press," and Ganino,
81the lenient standard case, repeatedly cited Press but never Novak.
Eventually, Novak's more stringent version emerged as the dominant
standard in the Second Circuit after Kalnit v. Eichler.9 Kalnit reaffirmed and
reduced the scope of motive and opportunity pleading by examining the
trends in Novak's survey of precedent and in other circuits. 0 The court de-
termined that allegations that were too general or conclusory were
insufficient to establish a strong inference of scienter, and at no point refer-
enced the view from Press that the standard must be lenient when
considering the intent of corporations.9' Since 2001, the Second Circuit
stopped relying on the Press line of cases entirely when applying the motive
and opportunity test, in favor of the Novak and Kalnit line.92 The decisions
in Novak and Kalnit have repeatedly been cited for their formulation of the
requirements necessary to satisfy the motive and opportunity test.93 While
the Second Circuit has not explicitly overruled Press and its progeny, the
fact that it has discontinued use of the lenient standard and consistently util-
ized the more stringent one indicates the court has chosen to follow that
stricter standard.
Under this stricter implementation of the motive and opportunity test, al-
legations of motive and opportunity that do not give rise to a strong
inference of scienter are blocked by the restrictions described in Novak and
Kalnit.9 4
Examining the Second Circuit caselaw in 1999, the Sixth Circuit recog-
nized that pleadings should only pass the motive and opportunity test when
they allege sufficient facts to give rise to a strong inference, but then went
85. Rothman, 220 F.3d at 81.
86. Ganino, 228 F.3d at 154.
87. Rothman, 220 F.3d at 81.
88. Ganino, 228 F.3d. at 154.
89. 264 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001).
90. Id. at 139-42.
91. See id.
92. A survey of the Second Circuit's opinions assessing motive and opportunity reveals that
the Second Circuit did not issue an opinion citing Press for its description of standards for the mo-
tive and opportunity test since Kalnit was decided in 2001. The author examined all Second Circuit
decisions citing Press.
93. E.g., ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553
F.3d 187, 198 (2d Cir. 2009); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc.,
531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008); Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 340 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir.
2003).
94. Ray J. Grzebielski & Brian 0. O'Mara, Whether Alleging "Motive and Opportunity"
Can Satisfy the Heightened Pleading Standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Much Ado About Nothing, I DEPAUL BUS. & CoM. L.J. 313, 329-30 (2003).
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on to reason that the test was invalid because it could be satisfied absent
such facts. That case, however, establishing the holistic balancing test that
became known as the intermediate approach, was decided when the Second
Circuit's standard was in flux." Thus, the problems that led the Sixth Circuit
to declare the motive and opportunity test invalid have since been resolved
with the dominance of the stricter motive and opportunity standard.
The restrictions in Novak and Kalnit have the effect of limiting the mo-
tive and opportunity test so it is only satisfied in those situations that the
Sixth Circuit, and other courts using the intermediate approach, would con-
sider appropriate.97 In a post-Kalnit decision, the Eighth Circuit, one of the
courts that adopted the intermediate approach, noted that the Second Cir-
cuit's approach looks for facts that strongly suggest wrongdoing, just like
the intermediate approach. 8 Thus the fear that induced courts to subscribe to
the intermediate approach-that the motive and opportunity test will let cas-
es survive on pleadings that do not establish a strong inference of scienter-
is unfounded.9
C. The Specter Amendment
After the enactment of the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit advanced the the-
ory that the legislative history of the Specter Amendment demonstrated that
the PSLRA eliminated the motive and opportunity test. The amendment
would have codified the Second Circuit's two-part test into the PSLRA,'0
but it was deleted by the conference committee. The Ninth Circuit inter-
preted this as an implicit rejection by Congress of the Second Circuit's
test.' 1o The Ninth Circuit further supported its theory with the fact that Presi-
dent Clinton vetoed the PSLRA with a statement that the bill raised the
pleading standard above the Second Circuit, and Congress overrode his ve-
to. However, an examination of the legislative history demonstrates that
neither the committee notes nor the circumstances surrounding the veto
override invalidate the motive and opportunity test.
95. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999).
96. The Press decision, announcing the less stringent standard, came out in February 1999.
Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999). In re Comshare was decided in
July 1999. 183 F.3d at 551. Courts around the country cited to In re Comshare when deciding to
adopt the intermediate approach themselves.
97. Grzebielski & O'Mara, supra note 94, at 328-30.
98. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th Cir. 2001).
While the standards may be similar in this respect, there are still important differences in the effects
of applying each. See infra Part IV.
99. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d at 659 ("Taken as a whole, the cases simply do not
substantiate the fear that courts applying the motive-and-opportunity formulation will permit plead-
ings to go forward without facts strongly suggesting wrongdoing.").
100. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 671-72.
101. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme
Court has previously interpreted statutes using the presumption that when Congress includes limit-
ing language in a draft of a bill, and then later removes that language, those limitations are not
intended to be part of the final bill. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983).
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I. The Conference Committee Notes
The Ninth Circuit supported its view that the conference committee's re-
jection of the Specter Amendment 0 2 was a rejection of the motive and
opportunity test by looking to the conference committee's notes. These
notes state, "Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen exist-
ing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard.,"o3 The footnote to this sen-
tence, footnote twenty-three reads, "For this reason, the Conference Report
chose not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to
motive, opportunity, or recklessness.""0
However, there are other possible interpretations of the history besides
the one advanced by the Ninth Circuit. Congress may have rejected the
Specter Amendment to avoid binding the courts to a narrowly defined stan-
dard, a view expressed by Senator D'Amato, a vocal member of the
conference committee.'05 This would allow courts to choose exactly how to
evaluate a "strong inference" of scienter so that perhaps they could improve
on the standard. Rejection of the Specter Amendment may have also been
much more political than substantive. Passage of the PSLRA required broad
support in order to override the presidential veto, and it is possible that the
Specter Amendment could have upset the political balance needed in order
to assure the passage of the bill.'
The meaning of the committee's notes is also ambiguous. The footnote
quoted above could mean that the language about motive, opportunity, and
recklessness was not included either because the committee wanted to raise
the pleading standard above the Second Circuit's standard or simply because
it did not intend to codify the Second Circuit's caselaw.0 o The conference
committee could not have intended the former because the PSLRA is based
on the Second Circuit's standard, and the standard is reflected in the case-
law.'ao Congress would not have directed courts to look at the Second Circuit
standard if it intended to create a higher standard. Furthermore, Congress
explicitly said that the PSLRA does not create a "new and untested pleading
standard.""
102. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 654.
103. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 n.23 (1995)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740).
104. H.R. REP. No. 104-139, at 41 n.23.
105. Eugene P. Caiola, Comment, Retmactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the Uni-
form Security Litigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REv 309, 349 (2000).
106. See id. The political balancing for this bill was particularly precarious; if two senators
had switched sides the override would have failed.
107. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 656.
108. Id.; see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
109. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
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2. The Congressional Override of President Clinton's Veto
The Ninth Circuit finds additional support for its view that Congress re-
jected the Second Circuit's test in the override of President Clinton's veto.
President Clinton said he vetoed the PSLRA because he would not endorse
a higher standard than the Second Circuit's, but Congress chose to override
that veto and pass the PSLRA anyway."0 If the president vetoed the bill be-
cause he felt the pleading standard was higher than the Second Circuit's and
Congress overrode the veto (rather than modify the law), this might show
that Congress intended the bill to impose the higher standard. The discus-
sions in Congress after the president's veto run contrary to the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation, however. President Clinton's veto message focused
on how the wording of the PSLRA, supplemented by the conference com-
mittee notes described above, indicated a pleading standard higher than the
Second Circuit's."' The committee members distanced themselves from the
president's interpretation in discussions on the Senate floor, with Senator
Dodd arguing that the pleading provision met the Second Circuit's standard
and that the Specter Amendment was omitted because it did not really fol-
low that standard."12 These statements from the committee members refute
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history as prohibiting the
use of the motive and opportunity test. Other circuits have likewise exam-
ined and rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation as "giv[ing] the deletion
of the Specter amendment a more pointed reading than it will bear."'
Thus, before the Supreme Court decided Tellabs, the motive and oppor-
tunity test was still applicable as a means of satisfying scienter under the
PSLRA. As pleading motive and opportunity was part of the Second Cir-
cuit's pre-PSLRA standard-which was the strictest in the country and upon
which the PSLRA was based-the PSLRA's new heightened pleading re-
quirement did not eliminate the test. Now that the Second Circuit has settled
on the more stringent interpretation advanced in Novak and Kalnit, there is
no danger of pleadings passing the motive and opportunity test without giv-
ing rise to a "strong inference of scienter" as the circuits following the
intermediate approach feared. Finally, despite the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion, "4 the legislative history surrounding the Specter Amendment does not
prohibit use of the test.
III. THE MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY TEST Is NOT
PROHIBITED BY TELLABS
The Supreme Court's most recent major ruling discussing the PSLRA's
pleading requirements does not prohibit the use of the motive and opportu-
110. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999).
Ill. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 659-60.
112. Id. at 660.
113. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th Cir. 2001).
114. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978.
640 [Vol. 109:625
Revitalizing Motive and Opportunity
nity test. The 2007 decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd."'
addressed and clarified the pleading standard for scienter under the PSLRA.
In Tellabs, shareholders brought suit against the president of a manufactur-
ing company for allegedly inflating his company's stock price by falsely
informing investors that demand for the company's products was strong."'6
The district court found that scienter had not been adequately pled, but the
Seventh Circuit reversed."'
Vacating the Seventh Circuit's decision and declaring its standard inap-
propriate, the Supreme Court laid out a three-step process for determining
when pleadings gave rise to a " 'strong inference' of scienter": (1) take all
facts alleged in the complaint to be true; (2) rather than focusing on only an
individual allegation, consider whether all the facts alleged, taken together,
give rise to a strong inference of scienter; and (3) compare opposing infer-
ences and other possible explanations to ensure that a reasonable person
would find the inference of scienter "cogent and at least as compelling as
any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.""
The Supreme Court's decision in Tellabs was not meant to address the
circuit split on whether the motive and opportunity test was a viable means
of alleging scienter. Certiorari was granted only to determine whether courts
were required to consider competing inferences that could arise from the
same set of facts when determining whether a complaint adequately alleges
a strong inference of scienter."9 Therefore, any part of the decision discuss-
ing the motive and opportunity test is dictum. Yet, Supreme Court dictum
itself is still persuasive precedent for all lower courts,120 so if the Supreme
Court, even in dictum, denigrated the motive and opportunity test, it would
be a substantial blow to the test's legitimacy.
Despite the limitations on the question the Supreme Court sought to an-
swer, the Third Circuit concluded that Tellabs prohibited the use of motive
and opportunity pleading, either explicitly or by implication.' Section III.A
115. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
116. Id.at315-16.
117. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 605 (7th Cir. 2006). In revers-
ing the district court, the Seventh Circuit determined that rather than permitting complaints to
survive when the most plausible of competing inferences is that the defendant acted with the requi-
site scienter, a complaint should survive when it alleges facts from which a reasonable person could
infer the defendant acted with the necessary scienter. Id. at 602.
118. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322-24.
119. Id. at 317-18 ("We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Circuits on
whether, and to what extent, a court must consider competing inferences idetermining whether a
securities fraud complaint gives rise to a 'strong inference' of scienter.").
120. E.g., Brannigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 282 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing
Myers v. Loudoun County Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 406 (4th Cir. 2005)); Gaylor v. United States
74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]his court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta
almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings .... ); McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d
13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[F]ederal appellate courts are bound by the Supreme Court's considered
dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings, particularly when, as here, a dictum is of
recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement.").
121. E.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276 (3d Cir. 2009).
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examines the language of the decision, concluding that the Supreme Court
does not specifically eliminate motive and opportunity pleading. Section
HI.B argues that requiring courts to examine the complaint as a whole is not
contrary to use of the motive and opportunity test. Section III.C discusses
the requirement that courts take competing inferences into account when
assessing the adequacy of allegations of scienter and concludes that it does
not imply that use of the motive and opportunity test is prohibited.
A. Motive and Opportunity Can Still Be Sufficient Even Though
a Lack of Motive Is Not Fatal to a Complaint
The wording of the Tellabs decision demonstrates that the Supreme
Court did not adopt the Seventh Circuit's position that allegations of motive
and opportunity are insufficient. Instead, the Court said that a lack of motive
allegations is not necessarily fatal, nor is a motive allegation always suffi-
cient.12 Despite this, the language of the Tellabs decision convinced the
Third Circuit to abandon the motive and opportunity test and join other cir-
cuits in using the intermediate approach."2
Differences between the language used by the Supreme Court and the
Seventh Circuit indicate that the Tellabs decision did not endorse the Sev-
enth Circuit's position that motive and opportunity are insufficient to
demonstrate scienter. In refusing to utilize the motive and opportunity test,
the Seventh Circuit examined the pleading requirements under the PSLRA:
"Congress chose neither to adopt nor reject particular methods of pleading
scienter. .
... [T]he best approach is for courts to examine all of the allegations in the
complaint and then to decide whether collectively they establish such an
inference. Motive and opportunity may be useful indicators, but nowhere
in the statute does it say that they are either necessary or sufficient.'
In decreeing the Supreme Court's agreement with this proposition,' the
Third Circuit relied on the statement, "[W]e agree with the Seventh Circuit
that the absence of a motive allegation is not fatal. .. . [A]llegations must be
considered collectively; the significance that can be ascribed to an allegation
of motive, or lack thereof, depends on the entirety of the complaint."' 26
122. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
123. See Avaya, 564 F.3d at 277 (noting agreement with the Seventh Circuit's approach);
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the intermediate approach and how those
courts were concerned motive and opportunity might sometimes, but not always, establish a strong
inference of scienter).
124. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003)).
125. Avaya, 564 F.3d at 276-77.
126. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 325 (2007) (citing Makor
Issues & Rights, Lid., 437 F.3d at 601).
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Comparing the language of the Seventh Circuit's decision with the Su-
preme Court's shows that the Supreme Court did not fully endorse the
Seventh Circuit's declaration that the motive and opportunity test is imper-
missible. First, while the Seventh Circuit specifically says that "motive and
opportunity" are neither necessary nor sufficient, the Supreme Court never
discusses motive and opportunity.127 Instead, the Supreme Court limits its
discussion to motive alone.128 If the Supreme Court intended to specifically
eliminate the motive and opportunity test, it would have used the phrase
"motive and opportunity," as the Seventh Circuit did. The Supreme Court
only said motive is not always necessary, and that the significance of motive
depends on the rest of the complaint.129 The concept that the significance of
a motive depends on the entirety of the complaint is consistent with the Sec-
ond Circuit's motive and opportunity jurisprudence.130
Second, the Seventh Circuit stated that the PSLRA does not say motive
and opportunity "are either necessary or sufficient.""' Declaring the combi-
nation insufficient would destroy the motive and opportunity test. However,
the PSLRA's failure to state that it is either necessary or sufficient does not
require that conclusion. Although the Seventh Circuit attempted to declare
the motive and opportunity standard invalid, the Supreme Court's Tellabs
132
opinion did not do so.
The requirement imposed by Tellabs that the absence of allegations of
motive is not fatal does not prevent utilization of the motive and opportunity
test; it simply means courts cannot use it as their exclusive test for sci-
enter. 3 The Supreme Court agreed that a complaint could survive dismissal
127. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See infra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
131. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d at 601 (emphasis added).
132. The legal citations used by the Supreme Court further support this interpretation. The
language of the Seventh Circuit's decision directly supports the proposition that the motive and
opportunity test is not sufficient to allege scienter. Yet, when agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court cited to the Seventh Circuit's decision using the introductory signal "see." Tellabs,
551 U.S. at 325 (citing Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d at 601). The Bluebook, describing the
guidelines for use of legal citations, states that "see" is used "when the proposition is not directly
stated by the cited authority but obviously follows from it . . . ." THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM Sys-
TEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 54 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). If the
Court wanted to agree that the motive and opportunity test is inapplicable after the PSLRA, it would
have used no signal, which is appropriate when the cited authority "directly states the proposition."
The introductory signal "see" was used here, because one can infer that if the Seventh Circuit felt
both motive and opportunity could only be evaluated when looking at the whole complaint, then
certainly motive alone, one of the two aspects of that standard, could only be evaluated by viewing it
in light of the whole complaint. See id. Thus, the Supreme Court, while expressing partial agree-
ment with the Seventh Circuit, adopted only one piece of that court's position.
133. Additionally, even though the Supreme Court declared that motive is not necessary for
scienter to be adequately pled, courts do still consider motive a critical component in assessing
whether a complaint adequately alleges scienter, and courts do not allow complaints without eco-
nomically rational motives to survive. See infra notes 213-216 and accompanying text. Thus, one
would not expect too many complaints to fail motive but still successfully plead scienter, even
though such complaints may occasionally exist.
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even though it fails to allege motive.13 4 The motive and opportunity test al-
ways requires a showing of motive, and therefore using that test as a court's
only method of determining scienter would run afoul of the express lan-
guage in Tellabs. However, courts can avoid this problem by allowing a
supplemental test for determining scienter, which can be satisfied without
allegations of motive. The Second Circuit has long employed such a two-
pronged approach, allowing that "[t]he requisite 'strong inference' of fraud
may be established either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had
both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that
constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or reck-
lessness."' The courts recognize that absent a showing of motive, the
second prong can still be satisfied if the plaintiff can show conscious misbe-
havior or recklessness through circumstantial evidence. Thus, a
multipronged approach will allow courts to use the motive and opportunity
test without contradicting the decree from Tellabs that lack of motive allega-
tions is not fatal to a complaint.
B. The Complaint Is Examined as a Whole
Requiring that motive be considered in the context of the entire com-
plaint to determine whether scienter has been sufficiently pled is consistent
with the motive and opportunity test as implemented by the Second Circuit.
Courts and commentators have agreed that "bare allegations of motive and
opportunity" will not satisfy the PSLRA pleading requirement. 3 The Sec-
ond Circuit also does not allow bare allegations of motive and opportunity
to suffice. 13 This may have been more of a concern prior to Kalnit when the
Second Circuit still vacillated between more and less stringent variants of
the motive and opportunity test,' but the more stringent implementation of
134. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325 (citing Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d at 601).
135. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). This Note does not
argue that the second prong must be maintained when utilizing the motive and opportunity test.
Other courts might be able to design a better supplemental test that does not require motive. How-
ever, as the Second Circuit's second prong is a possible supplemental test, it provides an example of
how such a supplemental test could be designed. However this Note is only focusing on the benefits
provided by the motive and opportunity test itself.
136. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust
Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987)).
137. See, e.g., Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 867 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[Blare allega-
tions of motive and opportunity will not suffice to demonstrate scienter .... "); Nicole M. Briski,
Comment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did Con-
gress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive, and Opportunity?, 32 Lot. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 201 (advocating
that the Supreme Court adopt the standard that bare allegations of motive and opportunity do not
satisfy scienter).
138. James D. Cox et al., Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in
Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 421, 437 (noting
various limitations the Second Circuit has placed on what motives will satisfy the motive and oppor-
tunity test); see also Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2000).
139. See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
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the test used since Kalnit is not satisfied by motives that almost all corporate
insiders possess.140
The manner in which the more stringent standard is implemented dem-
onstrates that the motives are assessed in light of the entirety of the
complaint. Whether a motive is so general that all corporate insiders are
likely to possess it or is specific enough to satisfy the motive and opportu-
nity test depends on the entirety of the facts in the case.141 Comparing how
the Second Circuit handled two cases that allege the same motive but re-
sulted in opposite holdings illustrates this evaluative process. In ECA &
Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co.,
the allegations were that the company misstated its dealings to artificially
inflate its stock price and thus more cheaply acquire another company.142
However, the motive was found insufficient because the misstatements had
been occurring for eight years before the acquisition and did not stop until
years afterwards, indicating that the inflation was unrelated to the pur-
chase.143 In Rotheman v. Gregor, the allegations were again that a company
misstated its dealings to artificially inflate its stock price and thus more
cheaply acquire another company.1" However, here the court found that the
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged motive where the company refused to ex-
pense royalties-which increased its stock price-and then acquired a
company with some cash and 700,000 shares of stock. 145
Since it is possible for the same motive allegation in two different fac-
tual situations to result in different rulings, it is clear that the Second Circuit
looks beyond the "bare allegations" of motive and opportunity to make sure
the facts alleged give rise to a strong inference of scienter.146 Thus, the Su-
preme Court's declaration that "the significance that can be ascribed to an
allegation of motive, or lack thereof, depends on the entirety of the com-
plaint"147 is in full accord with the Second Circuit's implementation of the
motive and opportunity test. Rather than eliminating the motive and op-
portunity test as insufficient, the Supreme Court's Tellabs decision merely
agreed with the Second Circuit's position that not all allegations of motive
are enough to satisfy that aspect of the test.
140. See supra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
141. Compare ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co.,
553 F3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2009), with Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2000). Spe-
cificity itself does not satisfy the motive and opportunity test, but a complaint is viewed in context.
Some motives will seem generally applicable when taken out of context but seem clear evidence of
scienter in a particular situation. See infra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
142. ECA, 553 F.3d at 201.
143. Id.
144. Rothman, 220 F.3d at 93.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 142-145 and accompanying text.
147. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 325 (2007).
148. See ECA, 553 F.3d at 201.
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C. Competing Inferences
The motive and opportunity test is capable of weighing competing infer-
ences as required by Tellabs. In Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc.,
the Third Circuit did not rely only on the language from Tellabs quoted in
Section III.A in determining that the motive and opportunity test was no
longer viable,149 but also reasoned that the requirement that culpable and
nonculpable inferences be weighed was incompatible with the motive and
opportunity test.'50 This argument from Avaya consists of two parts: (1)
merely because a situation exists where motive and opportunity are present,
it does not follow that the most likely outcome of the situation is a securities
violation; and (2) if it is not true that the most likely outcome of the pres-
ence of motive is always a violation, then there is no reason to separate out
motive and opportunity with a distinct test.'"' The Third Circuit reasoned
that there are situations where a motive and opportunity to make misleading
statements exists, but the actor nevertheless chooses not to do so.'52 Since
culpable inferences need to be weighed against nonculpable inferences, if
people do not make misleading statements every time they have the motive
and opportunity to do so, one should not infer scienter just from motive and
opportunity.
The fact that certain types of motives are insufficient to satisfy the mo-
tive and opportunity test satisfies the Third Circuit's concern by filtering out
nonculpable actors. Restricting the types of motives that can apply and the
situations in which certain motives do apply, the motive and opportunity test
screens out nonculpable actors. This restriction also allows the motive and
opportunity test to take account of competing inferences. The more general
motives applicable to most corporate insiders, such as helping the corpora-
tion appear profitable or an executive's keeping his position in the
corporation,'- are eliminated, because the limitations on motives apply to
situations where courts have determined that the culpable inferences are not
at least as compelling as the nonculpable inferences.' For example, when
all that is alleged regarding an executive's motive for inflating stock price or
improving corporate performance is to receive more compensation, that mo-
tive is one that applies to every executive in the country.' 6 Assuming that
executives are more often working to improve their company rather than to
commit fraud or misrepresentation, it is more likely that the motives and
opportunities present in these situations lead to a nonculpable inference than
149. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.




154. E.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2000).
155. See ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553
F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2009).
156. Id.
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a culpable one. As a result, plaintiffs in these situations would not pass the
motive and opportunity test because the inference of scienter is not "at least
as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts al-
leged." 57
The fact-specific inquiry courts conduct to determine if a particular mo-
tive is sufficient in light of the facts of the particular case encompasses the
comparative standard of Tellabs. The Second Circuit does not just look at
the motive alleged, check if there was an opportunity, and rubber stamp the
complaint through the pleading stages. Whether or not the PSLRA's re-
quirements for pleading scienter have been satisfied by certain motives
depends on the facts of each case.18 The nature of this factual inquiry is
whether the particular situation makes the culpable inference more plausible
than the nonculpable inference. The previously discussed example of two
companies that allegedly inflated their stock prices to make an acquisition
cheaper demonstrates this point. Motive was sufficiently pled when one
company avoided paying royalties to raise its stock's value, but not when
another company misstated dealings for eight years before an acquisition
and for years afterwards.' The first company seems to be making a con-
certed effort to raise its stock price illegitimately, while the second company
appears to just be making a mistake. In such situations, where there is a
plausible, nonculpable way to explain the defendant's actions that is more
likely than the culpable inference, the motive and opportunity test is not
satisfied.'6 Thus, the motive and opportunity test already accounts for the
comparing of inferences required by Tellabs by both ruling out certain mo-
tives that do not lead to a more compelling inference of culpability and
requiring a fact-specific inquiry into certain motives.
The Supreme Court's decision in Tellabs did not discredit the use of the
motive and opportunity test as a valid means of demonstrating scienter. De-
spite the contrary view expressed by the Third Circuit in Avaya, the
Supreme Court did not endorse the Seventh Circuit's position that the
PSLRA's pleading requirements prohibit using the motive and opportunity
test to establish scienter. The statement that absence of motive allegations is
not fatal to a complaint accords with the Second Circuit's two-pronged ap-
proach and the fact-specific inquiry used to determine which motives are
sufficient in which situations looks at the complaint in its entirety, as Tellabs
requires. Furthermore, the motive and opportunity test weighs competing
inferences by setting up categories of motive as insufficient in situations
when that motive would not give rise to a culpable inference that was at
157. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
158. See supra notes 138-148 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 141.
160. See Atsi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324) (stating that because the circumstances of this situation are present for any
investor in this type of security, the nonculpable explanation that the parties engaged in a mutually




least as compelling as a nonculpable inference. Since it has not been prohib-
ited by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the PSLRA's pleading
requirement, the motive and opportunity test is still a viable means of estab-
lishing scienter, despite contrary opinions by the Third and Seventh Circuits.
IV. THE PSLRA's POLICY GOALS FAVOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY TEST
Congress passed the PSLRA with two purposes in mind: reduce frivo-
lous lawsuits alleging securities violations and promote uniformity in
securities laws throughout the country.'6' Of the three different positions
circuit courts have taken on the issue of pleading scienter, 162 the motive and
opportunity test is the best method of realizing these two goals. Section
IVA examines how the motive and opportunity test balances blocking war-
rantless claims against allowing meritorious ones, concluding that the
evidence does not show that the motive and opportunity test strikes this bal-
ance less effectively than the other circuit courts' standards. Section IV.B
then argues that the motive and opportunity test promotes more uniformity
in resolving lawsuits than the intermediate approach. Section IV.C examines
the practical effects of implementing the intermediate approach compared to
the motive and opportunity test, concluding that the vagueness of the inter-
mediate approach will result in additional costs to companies. Additionally,
since all courts still consider motive crucial, no matter which approach they
employ, the test the courts claim to utilize should recognize the importance
of motive so lawyers know that it is an important area on which to focus
their attention.
A. Balancing Stopping Meritless Lawsuits Against
Allowing Meritorious Claims
A primary purpose of the PSLRA was to reduce the number of war-
rantless lawsuits without blocking proper claims. While considering the
PSLRA, the Senate Subcommittee on Securities heard testimony that attor-
neys were filing strike suits in the hope that the target company would
quickly settle to avoid the costs of litigation. 16 The Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs determined that such strike suits chill
corporate disclosure and recommended that the PSLRA address this prob-
lem.'6 Recognizing that proper private securities lawsuits are vital to a well-
161. Bruce D. Angiolillo, Establishing Scienter in Securities Fraud Actions Thmugh Imputa-
tion of Knowledge, at 1011, 1013 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
19278 2009) (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 308).
162. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
163. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
164. Id.
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functioning economy, however, the PSLRA allows private actions to be
successfully brought against violators. *
Evidence that the dismissal rates from the Second Circuit are similar to
those of the Ninth Circuit and other circuits utilizing the intermediate ap-
proach suggests that the motive and opportunity test is not overly lenient.
While some courts and commentators have considered the Second Circuit's
motive and opportunity test too lenient, a statistical analysis of cases
throughout the country suggests that the Second Circuit's standard is com-
parable in stringency to the approaches taken by other courts. That study,
which examined federal securities law class actions, determined that rough-
ly 20 percent of the suits were dismissed within the first two years of filing
in both the Second and the Ninth Circuit. The circuits implementing the
intermediate approach have fewer cases than the Second and Ninth Circuits,
and the information obtained for those circuits is less dependable. Still,
averaging the dismissal rates for the various intermediate approach circuits
shows that they average around 20 percent as well.o70
Weighing the quantity of cases dismissed would be meaningless without
considering the types of cases heard in each circuit. If a circuit's test could
perfectly identify strike suits, lawyers would stop filing them, because there
would be no point in wasting the time and resources or risking sanctions by
filing strike suits that will just be dismissed. Thus, a stricter pleading stan-
dard could lower the dismissal rate by reducing the number of weak claims
alleged. The intermediate approach leaves open the possibility that motive
and opportunity may establish scienter, but requires that there also be suffi-
cient facts supporting the inference. 7 ' However, the Second Circuit's stricter
165. Id.
166. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 320 n.4 (2007) ("Nothing in the PSLRA, we have previously
noted, casts doubt on the conclusion 'that private securities litigation [i]s an indispensable tool with
which defrauded investors can recover their losses'-a matter crucial to the integrity of domestic
capital markets." (alteration in original) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006))).
167. See, e.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc, 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (suggesting
that the motive and opportunity test creates a pleading standard below what Congress intended when
passing the PSLRA); City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir. 2001); Moss,
supra note 55, at 1283 ("Congress intended to create a more stringent procedural requirement than
the Second Circuit's 'motive and opportunity' test . . . .").
168. See Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA,
39 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1163 (2007) (citing TODD FOSTER ET AL., NAT'L EcON. RESEARCH ASS'N,
RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: FILINGS PLUMMET, SETTLEMENTS
SOAR 4 (2007)). The study showed that the Second Circuit had a 19 percent dismissal rate and the
Ninth Circuit had a 20 percent dismissal rate within the study period. Id. However, such a minor
difference is statistically insignificant given the number of cases analyzed and the binary nature of
the data (cases are either dismissed or not dismissed).
169. See Mark, supra note 168, at 1163 & n.383. When a sample size is too small, the results
are less reliable.
170. See FOSTER E' AL., supra note 168, at 3-4. This Note assumes the distribution of cases is
the same each year as reported by NERA for 2005 and conducted a weighted average of the dis-
missal rates. While not perfect, the calculation still suggests that the intermediate approach results in
about as many dismissals overall as the other two standards.
171. Cox et al., supra note 138, at 433.
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motive and opportunity test is only satisfied in situations where there are
sufficient facts to give rise to a strong inference of scienter,'7 2 so there
should be no difference in the quality of cases between circuits implement-
ing the intermediate approach and the Second Circuit.' On the other end of
the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit's Silicon Graphics approach may have re-
sulted in higher quality cases, but that standard can no longer be applied in
light of Tellabs.174
Although the motive and opportunity standard is not as strict as the Sili-
con Graphics standard, the Silicon Graphics standard proved too strict to
comply with Tellabs. The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the idea that mo-
tive and opportunity could ever establish scienter, and instead required
particular facts that demonstrate a strong inference of deliberate reckless-
ness.' The complaint would be found deficient if the plaintiff did not
provide a large amount of corroborating detail for the facts upon which the
complaint was based. Recently, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Tellabs requiring the complaint to be viewed in its entirety, the Ninth Circuit
agreed that the Silicon Graphics standard was overly demanding in the level
of detail required and in eliminating vague statements from consideration.' 7
Thus, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its Silicon Graphics pleading standard.1
The remaining two approaches, the intermediate approach and the Sec-
ond Circuit's motive and opportunity test, both result in similar dismissal
rates. Therefore, the motive and opportunity test appears no less capable of
meeting the goal of dismissing unwarranted claims while still allowing me-
ritorious suits to proceed.
172. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
173. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 913, 946-47 ("That position is, for all practical purposes, identical to that of the Second
Circuit . . . .").
174. Studies conducted before Tellabs showed insider trading and accounting misrepresenta-
tion cases, considered stronger types of cases, constituted a higher percentage of the total cases
heard in the Ninth Circuit than in other circuits. Id. at 950-51. There were also greater declines in
filings in the Ninth Circuit compared to other circuits, id. at 956, which might suggest that attorneys
were more afraid to file weak claims in the Ninth Circuit than in other circuits. However, the differ-
ence by which filings in the Ninth Circuit declined compared to the other circuit courts was slight,
and thus may not have been significant. See id. Taken together, these facts suggest the Ninth Cir-
cuit's strict Silicon Graphics approach might have led to better quality cases.
175. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
176. S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 2008) (construing Silicon
Graphics, 183 F.3d at 985). Other circuit courts and commentators argued that the Silicon Graphics
standard was overly harsh, going beyond Congress's intentions in passing the PSLRA. E.g., Fla.
State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 n.21 (llth Cir. 1999) (calling it "super-recklessness"); Glen M.
Vogel & Nathan S. Slavin, Despite Initial Fears to the Contrary, It Appears that Sarbanes-Oxley
Gave Private Litigants a "Dull Sword" When it Comes to Piercing the Corporate Veil, 14 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 415, 426 (2009).
177. S. Ferry, 542 F.3d at 784.
178. Teamsters Local 617 Pension & Welfare Funds v. Apollo Grp., 633 F Supp. 2d 763,
788-79 (D. Ariz. 2009) (recognizing that South Ferry signaled a complete overhaul of the pleading
standards the Ninth Circuit developed in Silicon Graphics in order to conform with Tellabs).
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B. Providing Uniformity
Establishing a uniform pleading standard was one of the goals of the
PSLRA." 9 Before its passage, differing interpretations of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) resulted in widely varied pleading standards between
the circuit courts.so Since the PSLRA was passed, not only have circuit
courts split, but district courts and even panels of the same
circuit have rendered conflicting decisions about the pleading standard.'
The vagueness of the intermediate approach does not provide the uniformity
sought by the PSLRA.
The intermediate approach merely offers a general guideline that courts
should examine evidence that raises a strong inference of scienter.18 This
produces excessive variation among the circuits. Commentators note that the
wide freedom given to the courts under the intermediate approach makes it
the most ambiguous standard.' In a study examining dismissal rates, the
National Economic Research Associates ("NERA") found that both the
highest and the lowest rates of dismissals occurred in courts employing the
intermediate approach (31 percent in the Fourth Circuit and 5 percent in the
Tenth Circuit).184 Courts applying the same approach should not show such
substantial variations if the standard hopes to achieve uniformity.
Since the intermediate approach does not provide clear guidance on how
to evaluate scienter, the various circuit courts applying it have developed
different, and sometimes conflicting, approaches. For example, the Sixth
Circuit established a series of factors in Helwig v. Vencor Inc. that guide
courts in determining whether a complaint sufficiently pleads scienter.' The
179. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007); SENATE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 15.
180. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. "In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
181. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 678 ("[A]ggregate patterns of [district
court] behavior ... are, to a remarkable degree, statistically indistinguishable from a 'coin-toss'
model of judicial behavior."). The coin-toss model is that judges flip a coin to decide if the Second
Circuit standard should apply, and then if that standard does not apply, they flip a coin again to
decide between the intermediate approach and the Silicon Graphics standard. Id. at 643.
182. See, e.g., Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Chen v.
Navarre Corp. (In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig.), 299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2002); Helwig v. Ven-
cor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2001).
183. E.g., Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 672 ("The Intermediate standard is in
many ways the most ambiguous, giving courts wide latitude in determining whether to dismiss or
not based on a given set of facts.").
184. FOSTER ET AL., supra note 168, at 4.
185. Helwig, 251 F.3d at 552. The Helwig factors are:
(1) insider trading at a suspicious time or in an unusual amount; (2) divergence between inter-
nal reports and external statements on the same subject; (3) closeness in time of an allegedly
fraudulent statement or omission and the later disclosure of inconsistent information; (4) evi-
dence of bribery by a top company official; (5) existence of an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud
by a company and the company's quick settlement of that suit; (6) disregard of the most cur-
rent factual information before making statements; (7) disclosure of accounting information in
such a way that its negative implications could only be understood by someone with a high
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Helwig factors were taken from the First Circuit's decision in Greebel v.
FTP Software, Inc., where the First Circuit collected cases and provided a
list of examples of the types of evidence often used in that circuit to demon-
strate scienter.'" The Eighth Circuit often applies the Sixth Circuit's Helwig
factors,8 7 but will sometimes also use the Second Circuit's precedent.'8 In
one case, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit's determination
that an officer's desire to keep stock prices high to increase his compensa-
tion is not sufficient for motive," even though one of the Helwig factors is
that the defendants can be motivated by a desire to protect their salary.'9
Even if a court were to try to follow all of the Helwig factors, the list is not
exhaustive and there are no guidelines explaining what weight should be
accorded to each.
The Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test provides structured
guidance, explaining exactly what types of motives to look for and how
much weight certain factors should be accorded, leading to more reliable
decisions. Sufficient motives require the defendant to benefit in a concrete
and personal way from the alleged fraud. '' Generalized allegations are in-
sufficient, as are motives that all corporate officers possess.' Further
clarifying which motives fail the test, the Second Circuit considers certain
classes of motive insufficient, including making the corporation appear suc-
cessful, increasing performance-based compensation, and retaining the
benefits of one's position.'"
The Second Circuit standard should lead to uniform results, because
what the court needs to look for is clear. While individual courts could dis-
agree over whether all corporate officers possess a certain motive, the
numerous Second Circuit decisions declaring certain classes of motive suffi-
cient or insufficient provide guidance. There are still tough borderline
decisions that need to be made on a case-by-case basis, and therefore the
motive and opportunity test does not artificially force securities law cases
into a black-and-white framework.'9 Yet, specifically eliminating certain
degree of sophistication; (8) the personal interest of certain directors in not informing disinter-
ested directors of an impending sale of stock; and (9) the self-interested motivation of
defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs.
Id.
186. 194 F.3d 185, 196 (1st Cir. 1999).
187. E.g., Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 930 (8th Cir. 2008); In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig.,
299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2005).
188. E.g., In re K-tel Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 894 (8th Cir. 2002).
189. Id. The Eighth Circuit finds it important whether or not there is a sufficient motive be-
cause it requires stronger allegations when there is no motive. See Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v, Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 2001).
190. Helwig, 251 E3d at 552.
191. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2000).
192. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139-42 (2d Cir. 2001).
193. Novak, 216 F.3d at 307.
194. See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
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classes of motive provides more guidance than the intermediate standard's
broader, case-by-case determination.' 5
Uniformity is further augmented by the motive and opportunity test be-
cause it describes certain insufficient motives that are entitled to no weight
when assessing the complaint in its entirety. The Second Circuit has deter-
mined that different allegations of scienter can be examined individually
without violating Tellabs and that certain inadequate motives can never
combine to establish scienter. 196 As a result, if a complaint alleges one of the
motives the circuit has deemed always insufficient-such as the general al-
legations that a corporate officer wanted to keep his job, increase his
incentive-based compensation, or make the company seem profitable-it
will not add anything to the complaint.' 97
Reading Tellabs to prohibit the elimination of certain claims from con-
sideration would be illogical, since allowing such allegations would weaken
the standard below the pre-PSLRA level and excluding a small number of
specific claims is not overly harsh. The Supreme Court held that the PSLRA
instituted a high pleading standard.'" However, even before the PSLRA was
passed, the Second Circuit did not permit scienter to be established through
allegations that a corporate officer wanted to maintain the privileges of his
job'" or increase his incentive-based compensation.200 Neither is the motive
and opportunity standard so strict as to run afoul of Tellabs in the same way
the Silicon Graphics standard did: that standard eliminated all general alle-
gations from consideration,20' whereas motive and opportunity only blocks
consideration of certain types of allegations determined not probative of
scienter.202 Thus, the motive and opportunity test's assignment of zero
weight to certain types of allegations is consistent with the goals of Tellabs
and, as the listings of unacceptable motives provide a bright-line rule, better
ensures uniform application.
195. While at least one group of commentators argues that the motive and opportunity test is
hard to apply because the Second Circuit reversed more district court decisions than any other cir-
cuit court, see Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 668-69, 674, that problem should be
resolved now that the lenient formulation from Press has been eliminated. See supra notes 91-93
and accompanying text. However, the study by Pritchard and Grundfest only considered cases
through November 2001 (i.e., before the lenient formulation from Press was eliminated). id. at 668;
see supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text, which explains the reversals. Now that the Second
Circuit has settled on a single interpretation, that variation should be eliminated. See supra notes
93-99 and accompanying text.
196. In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1999 WL 1029713, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 10, 1999)
cited with approval in Malin v. XL Capital, Ltd., 312 F. App'x 400, 402 (2d Cir. 2009).
197. See Malin, 312 F. App'x at 402 (stating that when the allegations do not individually
provide even a weak inference of scienter, there is no way they could combine to form a strong
inference of scienter).
198. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 321 (2007).
199. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
200. Acito v. IMCERA Grp., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995).
201. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
202. See Malin, 312 F. App'x at 402 (referring only to situations where the allegations did not
even give rise to a weak inference of scienter).
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C. Practical Difficulties in the Intermediate Approach Are Not Present in
the Motive and Opportunity Test
The intermediate approach emphasizes a case-by-case, fact-specific ap-
proach to determine when a complaint adequately pleads scienter. As a
result, there is no clear, singular way to evaluate scienter under the interme-
diate approach. Some courts employ a list of factors which can help inform
whether scienter allegations are sufficient while other courts rely instead on
a general assessment of the complaint in its entirety.203 A lack of clear re-
quirements in the intermediate approach makes it harder to determine which
criteria are important in any given circuit.
As previously explained, the intermediate approach provides little guid-
ance on how to actually determine whether a complaint adequately alleges
scienter, which makes it difficult to prepare and successfully argue cases.
The Sixth Circuit's Helwig factors, also adopted by the First Circuit204 and
partially adopted by the Eighth Circuit,205 provide some structure to the sci-
enter inquiry, but still prove problematic. Although the Sixth Circuit set out
a list of factors, those factors provide very little help in actually reaching
decisions. The factors do not provide an exhaustive list of the possible ways
to prove scienter, as Helwig clearly states, and therefore other types of ar-
guments can still be made.206 Additionally, no specific weights are attached
207to any of the factors. The relative weight of the factors also may depend
on the case at hand.208
The other circuits that have adopted the intermediate approach do not
utilize the Helwig factors, or any other specific list of criteria. These courts
inspected the PSLRA and decided that since Congress did not intend to sin-
gle out any particular way to prove scienter, decisions should be made by
looking at the complaint in its entirety without focusing on "specific catego-
203. See, e.g., Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); In re
Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2002); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540,
552 (6th Cir. 2001).
204. The factors originally came from the First Circuit's opinion in Greebel v. FTP Software,
Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
205. See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
206. Helwig, 251 F.3d at 552.
207. See Helwig, 251 F.3d 540. In City of Monroe, scienter was adequately alleged when the
court found one of the factors highly probative of scienter and three or four not probative. City of
Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 688-89 (6th Cir. 2005). In another
case, allegations against one defendant were sufficient when the court found three factors satisfied:
the defendant gained benefits in the form of a loan and renegotiated salary, made optimistic com-
ments four months before declaring bankruptcy, and there were violations of GAAP. D.E. & J. Ltd.
P'ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 743-44 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
208. Compare Conaway, 284 F Supp. 2d at 743-44 (listing factors that were met where the
strongest factor supporting scienter against one defendant seemed to be the large loan and salary
renegotiation he received), with PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 91 F. App'x 418, 438 (6th Cir.
2004) (stating that the evidence of their interest in saving their salaries only mildly suggests sci-
enter).
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ries" of evidence.209 The inquiry, then, is just a holistic examination of the
complaint to determine whether the court believes the facts alleged give rise
210to a strong inference of scienter.
When lawyers and business people are uncertain about exactly what the
court will look for and what is sufficient to meet the pleading standard, both
the cost of preparing and adjudicating claims increase. Preparing for cases
where the lawyer does not know exactly what the court will want takes more
time than does preparing for a case where the lawyer knows exactly what
the court will look for in the complaint. For example, if the court will allow
a pleading to survive with just a few clear Helwig factors, then the lawyer
can focus on providing just those few; but if the lawyer is not sure how
many factors are necessary, and how strong those presented should be, he
must spend more time trying to argue every factor in every way to maximize
the chances he will pass the court's unknown threshold of sufficiency. Such
complaints might take additional time to draft, costing clients money, and
additional time to analyze, draining judicial resources. The problem is fur-
ther aggravated if the court has not given any guidance other than that it will
examine the totality of the complaint. Such complaints will include an even
wider assortment of possible issues, further increasing drafting and review
time.
In contrast, even though there will still be borderline cases, the motive
and opportunity test provides clear examples of what will and will not suf-
fice. The Second Circuit has listed categories of motive that will fail to
sufficiently allege scienter,2" and therefore there is no need to waste time
arguing over whether such allegations will allow a complaint to survive the
pleading stage. Complaints are also easier to review because what the court
is looking for is clear: both motive and opportunity must be alleged, and the
232
motive cannot be from one of the categories of motives that are prohibited.
Courts already consider motive a critical factor in determining whether
scienter is adequately pled, and therefore any standard should openly ac-
knowledge that fact. Although Tellabs states that absence of motive
allegations is not fatal to a complaint,213 commentators found that no case
209. Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., 353 F.3d 338, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[C]ourts
should not restrict their scienter inquiry by focusing on specific categories of facts."); see also, e.g.,
Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2008) (examining the complaint holistically without
mentioning any particular factors the court was looking for); Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d
238, 246-47 (5th Cir. 2003) (looking at the totality of the circumstances of the complaint, rather
than any categories). While these circuits cited Helwig with approval when adopting the intermedi-
ate approach, they do not utilize the Helwig factors when determining whether a complaint
adequately alleges scienter.
210. E.g., Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345-46.
211. See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F3d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001) (listing several types of mo-
tive allegations that do not give rise to a strong inference of scienter, including the desire to maintain
the appearance of corporate profitability, the desire of an executive to maintain his job or salary, the
desire to keep stock prices high, and the existence of incentive-based compensation structures).
212. See infra notes 78-81, 89-94.
213. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issus & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 325 (2007).
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without an economically rational motive has survived dismissal.2 4 Circuit
courts applying the intermediate approach have even noted that there are
times when motive and opportunity may give rise to a strong inference of
scienter.215 Some of these courts even analyze motive separately,216 which
shows they find it important enough to examine carefully. Since motive
plays such an important role in establishing scienter anyway, it makes sense
to have the standard courts use for evaluating scienter take motive into ac-
count more directly. Thus, implementing the motive and opportunity test
openly directs the courts' focus to a factor many already consider to be cru-
cial.
CONCLUSION
Not only is the motive and opportunity test, as developed and utilized by
the Second Circuit, still a viable standard after Tellabs, but it also best ac-
complishes the dual goals of the PSLRA. Because the courts now use a
stricter version of the original test, the likelihood of too many frivolous suits
surviving dismissal is low, meaning the test furthers the PSLRA's goal of
establishing a stringent pleading standard. Furthermore, because the motive
and opportunity test weighs competing inferences, it does not run afoul of
the Supreme Court's mandate in Tellabs that evaluating scienter is a com-
parative inquiry weighing the culpable inferences from the facts provided
against the nonculpable inferences. The motive and opportunity test also
balances the dual objectives of dismissing unwarranted litigation while per-
mitting legitimate suits at least as well as any other standard, and it provides
clear guidelines to ensure a uniform application. Moreover, it promotes eas-
ier administration. Thus, not only is the motive and opportunity test still
appropriate after Tellabs, but it accomplishes the two goals of the PSLRA-
allowing meritorious lawsuits to succeed while dismissing frivolous lawsuits
and establishing a uniform pleading standard throughout the country-better
than any other standard.
214. Ann Morales Olazibal & Patricia Sanchez Abril, The Ubiquity of Greed: A Contextual
Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 FLA. L. REv. 401, 404 (2008).
215. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Dorset v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 339-42 (5th Cir. 2008); Come-
lia I. Crowell GST Trust v. Possis Med., Inc., 519 F.3d 778, 782 (8th Cir. 2008).
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